This is a really interesting point. I think a practical issue in modern times as well is that companies are being inspired by SpaceX while forgetting that it took SpaceX alot of work to get to the point of being able to do things like casually land a 20 story tower in the middle of the ocean on a barge, let alone the even more ridiculous 'stunts' they're doing with Starship.
Apollo was starting from the perspective of trying to do something where it was even debatable about whether it was possible. And so I think there was a lot more 'humility' in design, for lack of a better word.
> Engineering design is a process of making informed decisions to creatively devise products, systems, components, or processes to meet specified goals based on engineering analysis and judgement. The process is often characterized as complex, open-ended, iterative, and multidisciplinary. Solutions incorporate natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering science, using systematic and current best practices to satisfy defined objectives within identified requirements, criteria and constraints.
> Constraints to be considered may include (but are not limited to): health and safety, sustainability, environmental, ethical, security, economic, aesthetics and human factors, feasibility and compliance with regulatory aspects, along with universal design issues such as societal, cultural and diversification facets.
It's not an MBA philosophy but is intrinsic to the profession. Apollo didn't go up because of vibes, it went up because engineers knew the goals going in and to figured out how much fuel was needed to go to the moon. It also went up because the United States was willing to spend over a quarter of a trillion dollars (adjusted for inflation) on getting there,[2] and ignored the arguments that it was a giant waste of money while there were social problems at home.[3]
[1]https://egad.engineering.queensu.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/...
> constrained optimization to meet customer needs
For most of its existence as a formal field, engineering wasn't about making geegaws that "meet customer needs." It was about building stuff that matters. Houses that didn't collapse. Roads and machines that made it possible to traverse vast distances. Toys that delighted us. Aquaducts that delivered clean water. Drainage that helped remove muck. Plumbing that cleaned our cities. Threshers that helped us harvest crops. Lights that vanquished the dark.
The story of engineering is the story of creating technology that helps alleviate want.
You can say that there was a "customer" for each, which is great and all, but that's not why we did it. We did it so that we could move out of the caves and not be in filth and muck all the time.
We did it because it felt good. And we did it because it was the right thing to do.
The MBA wants to build a thing as cheaply as can be while extracting maximum value from the process. Maintaining function is only relevant inasmuch as is necessary for marketing. Enshittification is offensive to the engineer, and is a deliberate calculated tactic for the MBA.
We're replete with case studies, but my favorite is Kitchen-Aid mixers which accumulated a reputation when they were the small version of Hobart mixers, and have in succeeding decades become a cheap pile of crap because the optimization does not care about quality of function so long as the appearance of quality can be maintained. And it's cheaper to look quality than it is to be so.
A close second is Singer in the '70s, which for a while decided to ship items with 100-hour motors because "Folks don't usually spend much time _actually_ sewing". Contrast with the machines built a centuryish before. We've got an early electric model which is still doing fantastic precise work. The engineer would enthuse over the superb work that went into building such a tool, and the MBA would focus on the foregone sales, the value not extracted.
1960s US is hardly Siberia and I don't think any NASA engineers had their heads on the chopping block if their designs failed. But engineering philosophy was still rooted in survival; the primary goal was to make something that wouldn't kill you because it fails.
You hear stories about artisans in the old days refusing work because they don't believe what they're being asked to make is safe or reliable enough for the person asking for it. Maybe it's romanticized and idealized, maybe it's just them covering their ass so they don't get blamed. But that philosophy of personal responsibility not just for making things according to the constraints, but for the outcome too, is something that served society well for a long time before slowly disappearing over the past century or so.
It hasn't left without reason. As the things being made became less key to survival and more key to thrival, as the world became more interconnected and safe, it didn't make as much sense. Just think of how many crazy, inventive concepts we use every day wouldn't have been made if they could only be made to work reliably! Our entire modern existence is based off things that don't work reliably. It's a blessing and a curse.
But when we're exploring the final frontier we need frontier thinking and frontier technology; things that, from the ground up, are built to work first with all other constraints secondary. Unfortunately spaceflight endeavors today must invariably build off the 'good enough, when it breaks just make a new one' foundation that permeates modern design at every level. Even if you want to make something nowadays with the sole purpose of working, as long as you're using any technological advancements made in the past 50 years chances are you're using something that wasn't made with that goal in mind.
When engineers were working on Apollo and lunar landers, they were working on a set of customer requirements a mile long. Roving tinkerers didn't build the moon rockets. Engineers spent countless hours in design reviews with the customer, in this case, NASA.
Roman engineers didn't build aqueducts and colosseums on a lark, or some sense of poetic destiny.
Matters to whom?
Answer: that's the definition of a customer in an engineering project
Matters how / why?
Answer: those are the requirements / user stories.
Helping people by doing engineering feels good and is the right thing to do, but formalizing this process a bit does not detract from it.
I wonder how much of that is because of public attitudes to government spend. Like if a SpaceX rocket blows up, they're taking innovative, risk-taking approaches to rocket development. If a NASA rocket blows up they're wasting tax payer funding.
Similarly the pressure on NASA to have fewer programs for cost saving is similar. If NASA has two rocket programs, one of which is at a "good enough" level for launching satellites economically into space and one of them is a "safety conscious" rocket for manned launches at a higher per-mission cost, then people look at this and think why is NASA duplicating work and spending. So now they get only one program, so then even launching a GPS satellite is the expensive, human-safe rocket.
Dropping the last 4 metres isn't a sign of having a ruggedized, over-speced "takes a lickin' and keeps on kicking' approach". In lunar gravity, you could drop a raw egg from that height and not perturb the chick inside.
Instead the aim is to avoid throwing up too much moon dust with retro rockets.
Luna 9 (1966) really did need to withstand a bit of a bump, but it was 22km/h, comparable with a fast running pace or a car in first gear, not a high speed impact.
Just for maximum pedantry:
Falling 4 m on the moon is like falling 66 cm or about 2 feet on earth. I don’t know about your eggs but the ones I know wouldn’t survive that.
Just youtubers doing youtube things, I guess.
Though, again, it's been a while since I watched it.
That's because the powers that be surround themselves with yes-men or (equivalently) people are afraid of the consequences for stating their honest opinion, when that opinion is negative. It's a problem as old as time. "The Emperor's New Clothes" is based on tales dating back to around 1000AD, and I'm sure it goes back far further than that. This problem destroys competence, destroys countries, and has become ubiquitous in every single aspect of high level public (and to a lesser degree even high level private) decision making in the US.
Notice how things seem to constantly just go wrong in spite of effectively endless resources and manpower? If you look at what we have today in terms of any quantifiable metric we should be able to run circles around the 60s (in terms of, amongst other things, tech advancement) with our eyes shut, yet in practice we're struggling to recreate what they did in the 60s, in 7 years, starting from nothing and on a [relatively] extremely limited budget.
It doesn't matter how much mass was saved and how much more payload that allowed to reach the surface if the landing isn't successful. Successful landing is mandatory for anything else to matter. The obviousness of this baffles me that it is taken so haphazardly.
Though, of course, I wonder how many landings they are planning to do, and how many of them they need to do to compensate for each failure to land.
The mindset difference seems to be that if there's no human on board, so no problemo wasting a lander if something goes wrong. That's just a bad attitude (as well as yaw and roll). If you designed everything with "baby on board" hanging in the window, you'd probably not cut so many corners so sharply. Otherwise, why not just light your cigars with hundred dollar bills. How would you feel if you were on the team building the payload, but the lander guys keep fucking up so you just wasted however much time you spent because "meh, we're just testing". In sports, there's a saying "practice like you play because you play like you practice".
I think this is the smoking gun. RADAR is usually successful, while LIDAR has a poor record.
Robert Truax, the designer of the Sea Dragon, loved to promote the design paradigm of Big Dumb Boosters. Instead of many small, sophisticated rocket engines, what if we made one big robust one that can take a lickin' and keep on kickin'.
The idea was to relax the mass margins and to create big. dumb. boosters. It's the approach TRW explicitly followed for the Lunar Module engine,
The Surveyor program managed to make it "just work" 5 out of 7 times by adopting this approach. It had robust landing legs and RADAR. They would decelerate and then shut off the engine 11' above the surface. The wide, sturdy legs would then absorb that final impact of coming stand still from free fall.These programs had a lot of capital behind them. Some components required precision engineering, but there's a very clear through line and embrace of the "we gotta make stuff that can take a lickin' & keeps kickin'" philosophy.
Modern engineering approaches seem to be the opposite of that. I think we've become so accustomed to living in a silicon driven world where our personal devices are engineered at microscopic level that we've forgotten how to do things the Apollo-era way.
For example, to the best of my knowledge, IM-2 doesn't use RADAR — they're using LIDAR and optical navigation instead. Perhaps it is to save on mass and power so that more payload reaches the surface. Perhaps optical navigation was declared to be "good enough." Perhaps it doesn't make sense from a minmaxing of capital perspective. But this philosophy may not be suited to an untamed frontier.
China adopted the Surveyor / Apollo-era philosophy. Their first successful lander, Chang'e 3, used the same hover & fall technique as Surveyor.
It chose the terminal landing sites with the help of LIDAR and its cameras, but it relied on RADAR and a suite of sensors to have robust navigation.The follow up missions up-ed the ante every time, but they seem to have consistently focused on the robustness of their craft over precision, MBA-spreadsheet-oriented minmax-ing.