https://www.x.org/archive/X11R7.5/doc/security/XACE-Spec.htm...
If you can't trust the process don't run it. If you have to run it, isolate all of it.
Wayland gives you neither the freedom to safely tailor your security policy, nor the security guarantees to warrant its inflexibility.
I mean, yeah, it does, maybe. So why bother creating a password to a service if their database is probably running Linux anyway and the rdbms is probably compromised and yadda yadda yadda. It's the kind of argument you can make for anything.
Also no - privilege escalation is not "numerous" on Linux. It's very difficult to do in practice. It's only really a problem on systems built on old kernels which refuse to update. But those will always be insecure, just like running Windows 7 will be insecure.
So basically we have two issues here:
1. either focus on security even though these changes don't really improve the threat model
2. or allow disabled users and anyone who uses accessibility features to use GUIs