Who uses password encrypted keys anyway ? No exfiltration protection, and a sitting duck for unlimited automated password guessing attempts.
Pre-Tahoe people used Yubikeys or Secretive. But now this native tool is a better option than Secretive, even if Yubikeys still have their uses for the power-users.
Also password managers like 1password or Bitwarden support ssh-agent protocol so one can have a master password that protects both stored passwords and keys.
Edit: I'm not suggesting an ssh key with a passphrase (or password) is better than what the article suggests; I'm only saying that adding a passphrase (or password) to an ssh key at least buys time to address the situation while the attacker is trying to break the encryption on the stolen key.
I am anti-Mac in every way, but I do use passphrase protected ssh keys so if someone were to get a copy of my ssh key, they would have to be able to break the encryption to use the key. I see a lot of devs using blank passphrases on their ssh keys, smh.
> sitting duck for unlimited automated password guessing attempts.
Using a passphrase on your ssh key has nothing to do with whether the ssh service is configured to allow or deny passwords.
Given the consistent use of "password" instead of "passphrase", I think they meant an exfil'ed encrypted key is vulnerable to no-rate-limit bruteforcing, in contrast with hardware-backed keys.
I'm anti-Mac but for the year recently that I had to use one at work, no choice...I had no issues, none, using gpg or using a passphrase on my ssh keys.