A programmable computer is a physical device which has input states which can be deterministicaly set, and reliably produce output states.
A digital computer is one whose state transition is discrete. An analogue computer has continuous state transition -- but still, necessarily, discrete states (by def of computer).
An electronic digital programmable computer is an electric computer whose voltage transitions count as states discretely (ie., 0/1 V cutoffs, etc.); its programmable because we can set those states causally and deterministically; and its output state arises causally and deterministically from its input state.
In any given context these 'hidden adjectives' will be inlined. The 'inlining' of these adjectives causes an apparent gatekeepery Lumpy/Splitter debate -- but it isnt a real one. Its just ignorance about the objective structure of the domain, and so a mistaken understanding about what adjectives/properties are being inlined.
It's unfortunate that "computer" is the word we ended up with for these things.
But to the overall point, this kind of reply is exactly why I don't think this is a case of L vs. S -- your reply just forces a concession to my definition, because I am just wrong about the property I was purporting to capture.
With all the right joint-carving properties to hand, there is a very clear matrix and hierarchy of definitions:
abstract mathematical hierarchy vs., physical hierarchy
With the physical serving as implementations of partial elements of the mathematical.
If you mean that classifications are a matter of convention and utility, then that can be the case, but it isn’t always and can’t be entirely. Classifications of utility presuppose objective features and thus the possibility of classification. How else could something be said to be useful?
Where paradigmatic artifacts are concerned, we are dealing with classifications that join human use with objective features. A computer understood as a physical device used for the purpose of computing presupposes a human use of that physical thing “computer-wise”, that is to say objectively, no physical device per se is a computer, because nothing inherent in the thing is computing (what Searle called “observer relative“). But the physical machine is objectively something which is to say ultimately a collection of physical elements of certain kinds operating on one another in a manner that affords a computational use.
We may compare paradigmatic artifacts with natural kinds, which do have an objective identity. For instance, human beings may be classified according to an ontological genus and an ontological specific difference such as “rational animal“.
Now, we may dispute certain definitions, but the point is that if reality is intelligible–something presupposed by science and by our discussion here at the risk of otherwise falling into incoherence–that means concepts reflect reality, and since concepts are general, we already have the basis for classification.
I don't think that's a caricature at all; I've often seen people argue that it should include things like Vannevar Bush's differential analyzer, basically because historically it did, even though such devices are neither Turing-complete nor contain logic gates.