AOSP's security posture is frustrating (as Google seemingly solely decides what's good and what's bad and imposes that decision on each of their 3bn users & ~1m developers, despite some in the security community, like Daniel Micay, urging them to reconsider). The steps Apple has been taking (in both empowering the developers and locking down its own OS) in response to Celebgate and Pegasus hacks has been commendable.
My lament is, Google did not push it through when it mattered as Apple here has (assuming FEAT_MTE4 is them solving similar problems to productize MTE for security).
> "some in the security community" being loud
Think the GrapheneOS authors deserve more respect. They aren't merely "loud", they shipped features that AOSP later incorporated.
I do agree it is a pain not seeing this becoming widely adopted.
As for disabling JIT, it would have the same effect as early Androids, lagging behind Symbian devices, with applications that were wrappers around NDK code.
DVM tried to mitigate the slowness with JIT+SSA, but ART mixed in JIT+SSA alongside AOT+PGO (that is, a no JITing ART means a full AOT ART, unlike in DVM where the Interp takes over when in vmSafeMode). Even if the runtime will continue to lag in terms of power/performance efficiency wrt ObjC/Swift, Google should at least let the developers decide if they want to disallow JIT from creating executable memory regions inside their app's sandbox, like Apple does: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/hardened-...
That's Apple and here is Google (who have been at memory safety since the early Chrome/Android days):
https://www.hackerneue.com/item?id=39671337Google Security (ex: TAG & Project Zero) do so much to tackle CSVs but with MTE the mothership dropped the ball so hard.