Arguing against things being "left to the market" in the abstract is not sufficient to address the particular incentives that are producing undesirable outcomes, and does not offer any viable mechanism for shifting those incentives.
Specific proposals that attempt to operationalize what you're arguing here always seem to gravitate toward giving monopolistic power to a specific institution that invariably demonstrates that its own incentive structures are riskier than those in the broader market, and its failure modalities far more destructive.
Is the risk of a hospital closing for purely financial reasons more or less acceptable than the risk of a state-run hospital being inefficient but guaranteed to exist? For critical infrastructure, I think that's a conversation worth having, and it's one that hand-waving about an all-encompassing 'market' obscures; dismissing a legitimate critique by framing the market as an all-encompassing force is just a rhetorical move.
Your comment seems to suggest that any attempt to change the market results in unfavorable results, but this doesn't hold up to scrutiny. I think you replied with a valid philosophical point, but you leaned too much on using it to challenge that anything could be done (when you yourself presented the idea that a mechanism was needed).
There is no such unmanipulated free market anywhere:
Perfect Competition: In reality, we have monopolies, oligopolies, and immense barriers to entry.
Perfect Rationality: Behavioral economics has thoroughly demonstrated that people do not act like perfectly rational, self-interested computers.
Perfect Information: There is almost always a significant knowledge gap between a seller and a buyer.
Since no truly free market exists, every economy is already a managed one. The real debate isn't whether we should intervene, but how we intervene and whose interests those interventions serve. I read selimnairb's point as that, for essential services, the rules should serve the public interest of stability and access, not just the private interest of profit.
We can examine the risks case-by-case. Here, the government is investing in a foundry. We could view the leverage this gains the US government as increasing the risk for political engineering above the previous risk of financial engineering. In financial engineering, Intel might prioritize its obligation to shareholders. In political engineering (if Intel were nationalized), Intel might keep an inefficient fab open to save jobs or just to win votes.
In the category of financial engineering as a risk, you might lump activity like stock buybacks put above R&D as exemplar of Intel. In fact, a criticism of CHIPS and this new government intervention often centers around the idea that Intel's leadership should not be rewarded.
Finally, a related case on the topic of Intel and national security: China's state-directed economy prioritizes national goals over private profit. After entering "the market," part of its core strategy has been to compel service to national interests rather than shareholders, and it seems that strategy has arguably driven its recent economic rise.