>And I would argue that MITMing communications is a lot hard for (non-nation state) attackers than compromising a host, so trust compromise is a questionable worry.
By that logic, we don't really need certificates, just TOFU.
> By that logic, we don't really need certificates, just TOFU.
It works fairly well for SSH, but that tends to be a more technical audience. But doing a "Always trust" or "Always accept" are valid options in many cases (often for internal apps).
It does not work well for SSH. We just don't care about how badly it works.
> It does not work well for SSH. We just don't care about how badly it works.
How "should" it work? Is there a known-better way?
And I would argue that MITMing communications is a lot hard for (non-nation state) attackers than compromising a host, so trust compromise is a questionable worry.