> But if you think about it for five minutes, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome lead to the same exact thing. Meaning: when the goal is equal opportunity there's no morally acceptable line until you get to total equality of outcome.

Well, that depends on what you consider "opportunity". For example (to divorce this from any politically sensitive groupings), does a lack of physical fitness count against one's "opportunity" to become an Olympic athlete?

If you accept that some people are more physically fit than others, and that this fact isn't encompassed by the concept of "opportunity", then you no longer conclude that "equality of opportunity" leads to "equality of outcome". (Never mind that an "equal outcome" here would require either everyone or no one to be an Olympic athlete.)

So the equity vs equality distinction is still valid. Where the thinking goes wrong is in taking the premise that an unequal (across groups) outcome somehow proves unequal opportunity, even under this definition of opportunity. To get there, you need to assume that all relevant traits either are equally distributed across groups, or would be in a condition where everyone is being treated fairly and morally. (I think the author ends up at the same ultimate conclusion as I do, but from a different angle - whereby the activists in question aren't treating the distinction as coherent; I see them as assuming it wouldn't matter. But it isn't clear to me whether the author means "Which is why there's no such thing as anti-woke, pro-equality of opportunity." as a direct claim, or as an attitude attributed to the activists.)

Which is a reasonable null hypothesis (and even if one could evidence an unequal distribution, it would be immoral to discriminate on that basis in the presence of any more accurate means of assessment). But hypotheses still need to be tested, and there can be an awful lot of "relevant traits" - including simple interest in the goal.

As a concrete example (and here we are pretty much forced to turn to politically sensitive groupings): imagine any hobby you like that is female-dominated. Would you take the dearth of men in those hobby spaces as evidence of some "unconscious bias" against men in those spaces? Or would you conclude that men are just statistically less likely to be interested in those activities, and that free people in a free society should be permitted to be interested or disinterested in whatever hobbies, and that there are fair reasons why we might see a gender bias in who has that interest? Would you accept that participating in the hobby could be seen as a valid expression or performance of femininity, and/or that vocally declaring disinterest in it could be seen as a valid expression or performance of masculinity? (Of course, not everyone would see things that way, and any men that are in the hobby are not necessarily rebelling against masculinity.)

Now, what if it's a male-dominated hobby, asking the question about women - why should the logic be any different?

P.S. Huh, it appears that actually is Yuri "Four Stages of Ideological Subversion" Bezmenov in the comments.