For that not to be the case, you'd have to take the position that humans experience consciousness and they talk about consciousness but that there is no causal link between the two! It's just a coincidence that the things you find yourself saying about consciousness line up with your internal experience?
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zo...
To deal with the awkwardly apparent fact that consciousness certainly seems to have physical effects, zombiephiles challenge the notion that physics is causally closed, so that it is conceivable that something non-physical can cause physical effects. Their approach is to say that the causal closure of physics is not provable, but at this point, the argument has become a lexicographical one, about the definition of the words 'physics' and 'physical' (if one insists that 'physical' does not refer to a causally-closed concept, then we still need a word for the causal closure within which the physical is embedded - but that's just what a lot of people take 'physical' to mean in the first place.) None of the anti-physicalists have been able, so far, to shed any light on how the mind is causally effective in the physical world.
You might be interested in the late Daniel Dennett's "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies": https://dl.tufts.edu/concern/pdfs/6m312182x
As many people have pointed out, Searle's argument begs the question by tacitly assuming that if anything about the room understands Chinese, it can only be the person within it.
First, while it is a fringe idea with little backing it, it's far from the most fringe.
Secondly, it is not at all known that animal brains are accurately modeled as an ANN, any more so than any other Turing-compatible system can be modeled as an ANN. Biological neurons are themselves small computers, like all living cells in general, with not fully understood capabilities. The way biological neurons are connected is far more complex than a weight in an ANN. And I'm not talking about fantasy quantum effects in microtubules, I'm talking about well-established biology, with many kinds of synapses, some of which are "multicast" in a spatially distinct area instead of connected to specific neurons. And about the non-neuronal glands which are known to change neuron behavior and so on.
How critical any of these differences are to cognition is anyone's guess at this time. But dismissing them and reducing the brain to a bigger NN is not wise.