That, and the fact that it wasn't was not communicated. The necessary assessments have not been done during Chernobyl No. 4s commissioning, hence not counter measures have beem defined and put in the procedures. The RBMK chief engineering org wanted to adress the incident in Lithuania, and informed operators and authorities about that intention. Chief engineering didn't follow up so, and nobody bothered asking where the announced measures and procedures were.
In the end the operators of Chernobyl No. 4 were the fucked ones, their procedures were incomplete, sometimes dangerously wrong. Leadership, incl. Dyatlov, failed to put a safety culture in place. The reactor design was not well understood, operating characteristics at below 50% capacity were never even analyzed or modelled, and inheretly unsafe (missing sensors, bad control rod design and operating procedures...). And the night shift wasn't even briefed on the test to be conducted.
One of the conclusions of INSAG-7 was, that the accident could even have happened with properly designed control rods, coolant failure could have led to the same accident. If your equipment is so inherently unstable and fragile, operating procedure, training and operators have to compensate. None of those measures was taken.
Heck, in some circunstances RBMK operators had to conduct up to 1,000 manual operations per hour (!) to keep the reactor stable. And by the way, the RBMK design didn't even meet Soviet design and safety requirements applicable in 70s when those reactors were designed.
A complete clusterfuck. The circumstances allowing said clusterfuck still exist everywhere, in all countries, industries and organisations to this day.
In the end the operators of Chernobyl No. 4 were the fucked ones, their procedures were incomplete, sometimes dangerously wrong. Leadership, incl. Dyatlov, failed to put a safety culture in place. The reactor design was not well understood, operating characteristics at below 50% capacity were never even analyzed or modelled, and inheretly unsafe (missing sensors, bad control rod design and operating procedures...). And the night shift wasn't even briefed on the test to be conducted.
One of the conclusions of INSAG-7 was, that the accident could even have happened with properly designed control rods, coolant failure could have led to the same accident. If your equipment is so inherently unstable and fragile, operating procedure, training and operators have to compensate. None of those measures was taken.
Heck, in some circunstances RBMK operators had to conduct up to 1,000 manual operations per hour (!) to keep the reactor stable. And by the way, the RBMK design didn't even meet Soviet design and safety requirements applicable in 70s when those reactors were designed.
A complete clusterfuck. The circumstances allowing said clusterfuck still exist everywhere, in all countries, industries and organisations to this day.