As these are more answers of opinion rather than factual questions about the network, I'm going to add a massive disclaimer here that "opinions may differ about what is or is not concerning".
1) No, because I would personally advise people in China do not whitelist sites whose purpose is to access such content. It is not even clear to me that people in China would want to run an exit node at all. There are billions of people in the world in countries other than China that can run exit nodes for that content so people in China will be able to access it without fear, and without anyone in China taking on that level of liability.
2) No, but with the great benefit that because everyone is using the same network, even if somehow (and I do not think this will be the case) there are only a small number of nodes willing to access that content (and one would expect that, in the eventual limit, this number should not be smaller than the number of Tor exit nodes that currently exist; though again: I think it will be much larger), then they will be cloaked within the content everyone else is accessing.
Essentially, it doesn't work to say "people who need access to a secure messaging service should use a secure protocol and everyone else can use Snapchat", and it also doesn't work to say "people who need to access criticism of President Xi can use Tor and everyone else can use the regular Internet". I want a billion people who are also doing things that would be considered insane on Tor--like browsing Netflix!--to be using this service, and to pull that off we need lots of exit nodes, which in turn means incentivized traffic and whitelists.
Put another way: I don't care if there are only 0.0001% of nodes that let you access criticism of President Xi if that is 0.0001% of some insanely large number and the result is "at least as many nodes as Tor", as that itself solves the #1 problem using Tor: that even accessing the Tor website already marks you as someone who is suspicious (as it is here in the United States and the surveillance programs we see).
1) No, because I would personally advise people in China do not whitelist sites whose purpose is to access such content. It is not even clear to me that people in China would want to run an exit node at all. There are billions of people in the world in countries other than China that can run exit nodes for that content so people in China will be able to access it without fear, and without anyone in China taking on that level of liability.
2) No, but with the great benefit that because everyone is using the same network, even if somehow (and I do not think this will be the case) there are only a small number of nodes willing to access that content (and one would expect that, in the eventual limit, this number should not be smaller than the number of Tor exit nodes that currently exist; though again: I think it will be much larger), then they will be cloaked within the content everyone else is accessing.
Essentially, it doesn't work to say "people who need access to a secure messaging service should use a secure protocol and everyone else can use Snapchat", and it also doesn't work to say "people who need to access criticism of President Xi can use Tor and everyone else can use the regular Internet". I want a billion people who are also doing things that would be considered insane on Tor--like browsing Netflix!--to be using this service, and to pull that off we need lots of exit nodes, which in turn means incentivized traffic and whitelists.
Put another way: I don't care if there are only 0.0001% of nodes that let you access criticism of President Xi if that is 0.0001% of some insanely large number and the result is "at least as many nodes as Tor", as that itself solves the #1 problem using Tor: that even accessing the Tor website already marks you as someone who is suspicious (as it is here in the United States and the surveillance programs we see).
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/d73yd7/how-the-ns...